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WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND SHARI’A LAW: A 
WORKABLE REALITY? AN EXAMINATION OF 
POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
APPROACHES THROUGH THE CONTINUING 
REFORM OF THE PAKISTANI HUDOOD 
ORDINANCE 
KATHERINE M. WEAVER* 
  Hudood laws are a tool in the hands of men—with these laws they 
can rape women and be totally unaccountable. . . .  Many religious 
scholars are producing research which says that these laws are not in 
accordance with the Holy Koran. They are political tools to control 
women in our country.1 
  The divides are not Islam and western society, the divide is 
between people who have different values. We must promote 
connections between people who want to contribute to human values. 
People who share that commitment can collaborate across cultural 
divides.2 
INTRODUCTION 
There is continued debate over the ability to reconcile Islamic 
Shari’a3 law with universal human rights, specifically women’s rights.4 
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 1. Pakistani Women Speak Up on Rape, BBC NEWS, Sept. 26, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/south_asia/4271504.stm (quoting Uzma Saeed, a legal activist working for the repeal of the 
Hudood Ordinances in Lahore, Pakistan). 
 2. Religion and Culture: Meeting the Challenge of Pluralism: Abdullahi Ahmed An-
Na’im, http://www.religionandpluralism.org/AbdullahiAnNaim.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2006) 
(quoting Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law, Emory 
University). 
 3. Also written as Shari’ah.  See THOMAS PATRICK HUGHES, A DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 
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With the United States’ war against terror and the war in Iraq, 
tensions are mounting and cultural divides between Islamic nations 
and the western world seem to be widening rather than moving 
toward consensus.  Scholars have argued human rights work in these 
countries cannot be effective so long as there is a perception of 
“exclusive Western authorship.”5  This association of the West with 
human rights has been tied particularly to women’s rights, with 
Islamic traditionalists arguing female liberation would lead to a 
degeneration of the traditional Islamic family.6 
This Note challenges the concept of international human rights 
as separate from the possibility of human rights protection under 
Shari’a law, using Pakistan’s Hudood Ordinance of 1979 (Ordinance) 
as a case study.  The unreformed Ordinance, under Shari’a law, 
placed rape in the same category as adultery (zina).7  The law has 
garnered international attention through attempted reforms and 
compromises that would make the law more equitable to female rape 
victims; these reforms have been adamantly opposed by Islamic 
fundamentalist groups in Pakistan but were partially passed in 
November 2006.8 
Part I examines Pakistan’s emergence as an independent nation, 
along with its religious identity and the continuing tension between 
the secular and religious legal systems, including an analysis of the 
Hudood Ordinance and its evolution.  Part II explores why 
international human rights mechanisms have been unsuccessful in 
achieving significant reforms and how they could be modified or used 
in tandem with Islamic conventions to bring about change for women.  
Part III hypothesizes on workable realities within Pakistan, using 
both international instruments and working within the current 
constructs of Shari’a and secular law.  Part IV concludes that the 
international human rights movement must be flexible in its methods, 
partnerships, and approaches to Shari’a law, particularly within 
countries, such as Pakistan, which have formed much of their national 
 
 4. See Jason Morgan-Foster, Third Generation Rights: What Islamic Law Can Teach the 
International Human Rights Movement, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 67, 70 (2005) 
(explaining competing theories on the universality of human rights norms with respect to Islam). 
 5. Id. at 71. 
 6. See Donna Lee Bowen, Islamic Law and the Position of Women, in ISLAM AND SOCIAL 
POLICY 44, 45-46. (Stephen P. Heyneman ed., 2004). 
 7. The Offense of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979) § 6 (Pak.). 
 8. Salman Masood, World Briefing Asia: Pakistan: Uproar over Changes to Rape Laws, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at A6; Pakistan Votes to Amend Rape Law, BBC NEWS, Nov. 15, 
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6148590.stm. 
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identities through their religious beliefs.  Shari’a law provides a 
framework for women’s rights, but only through solidified bodies of 
law and through certain interpretations.  Through flexibility and 
inclusiveness, these constructs can bridge the gap between Shari’a and 
universal international human rights doctrines. 
I.  HISTORY OF PAKISTANI  
LAW AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 
A. Pakistan’s Identity 
The nation-state of Pakistan was formed with the partition of 
British India in 1947.9  The division was along religious lines, creating 
a Hindu majority in India and a Muslim majority in Pakistan.  The 
formal separation was an attempt to end the violence that had broken 
out between the two groups.10  Thus, religion has always been central 
to the identity of the Pakistani people and the formation of a cohesive 
nation: “Continuing controversy over the role of Islam in Pakistan’s 
political life and tension among the country’s ethnic groups have 
dominated the process of state-building in Pakistan since 
independence.”11 
Pakistan’s “founding father,” Mohammed Ali Jinnah, advocated 
for a separate nation-state because he feared persecution of the 
Muslim minority in India; however, he did not intend to form a 
theocracy within the state of Pakistan.12  Instead, he desired a more 
representative government for the people.13  Jinnah was also an 
advocate for women’s rights.14 
Jinnah’s ideas of government were not entirely accepted; fierce 
debate over the role of Islam within the formation of legal structures 
continued in Pakistan for nearly a decade after the country’s 
inception, leading to severe instability and lack of faith in the 
 
 9. Jeffrey A. Redding, Constitutionalizing Islam: Theory and Pakistan, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 
759, 763 (2004). 
 10. See Double Jeopardy: Police Abuse of Women in Pakistan, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(1992), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/pakistan/. 
 11. Id. at 7. 
 12. Id. at 8. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Mazna Hussain, Note, “Take My Riches, Give Me Justice”: A Contextual Analysis 
of Pakistan’s Honor Crimes Legislation, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 223, 238 (2006) (citing 
Jinnah’s criticism of traditional customs that marginalize women). 
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government.15  The military coup of 1958 came as little surprise.16  
General Ayub Khan, the coup’s leader, attempted to institute secular 
legal reform, which was particularly advantageous to women as the 
reforms affected family law ordinances; however, he also detracted 
from the freedoms of the people by banning all political parties.17  The 
Khan years saw increased growth of industry, but also increasing 
problems with eastern Pakistan, now Bangladesh, which was then 
advocating for its independence.  The country entered a bloody civil 
war in 1971, its most severe political crisis.18  India eventually 
intervened and Bangladesh was declared independent.19 
Elections were finally held in Pakistan in 1972, ending years of 
martial law.  Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was elected into the office of prime 
minister.20  Women participated in large numbers during this political 
period, which also saw the introduction of a new constitution, passed 
in 1973.21  The Constitution itself demonstrates the continuing 
compromise between conservative religious authorities and advocates 
for a modern, secular nation-state that advocated for the equal rights 
of all its people.  Article 2 states, “Islam shall be the state religion of 
Pakistan;”22 while Article 25 asserts, “(1) All citizens are equal before 
law and are entitled to equal protection of law; (2) There shall be no 
discrimination on the basis of sex alone; (3) Nothing in this Article 
shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the 
protection of women and children.”23  Bhutto attempted to bridge the 
interests of the religious and secular leaders with his “Islamic 
socialist” program, but many religious leaders decried his legal 
reforms and push for equality as “un-Islamic.”24 
In 1977, Bhutto was reelected despite much opposition and 
rioting in the streets.25  Martial law was imposed, but that same year, 
Bhutto and his progressive regime were overthrown by General Zia 
ul-Haq during the country’s third military coup.26  Attempts and 
 
 15. See Double Jeopardy, supra note 10, at 8. 
 16. See id. at 8-9. 
 17. Id. at 9. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. PAK. CONST. art. 2. 
 23. Id. art 25. 
 24. Double Jeopardy, supra note 10, at 9-10. 
 25. Id. at 10. 
 26. Id. 
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arguments to make Pakistan more “Islamic” had been a continuous 
part of the country’s history; “each time Pakistan faced hard times, 
the leader most able to promise a stronger future of Islam 
prevailed.”27  Zia depended on Islamic values and rhetoric to 
legitimize his regime and consolidate his power.28  Claiming to work 
within the constructs of the existing constitution, Zia instituted 
multiple changes according to the desires of the religious 
conservatives.29 
The “Islamization of Pakistan’s constitution” began in 1962, 
when Bhutto tried to appeal to religious fundamentalists by 
instituting the repugnancy clause, which stated, “No law shall be 
repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the 
Qur’an and Sunnnah and all existing law shall be brought into 
conformity therewith.”30  Zia continued this trend, becoming much 
more extreme in his changes, most importantly setting up the Shariat 
courts as a “parallel” to the “mainstream” judicial system.31  The 
Hudood Ordinances were placed under the jurisdiction of the Shariat 
judicial system.32 
B. Shari’a Law, the Hudood Ordinance, and “Islamization” 
The Hudood Ordinances and the Shariat courts in Pakistan claim 
to be based upon the true Shari’a law.33  The Shari’a “covers all 
aspects of human existence, including life after death.  It does not 
represent a set of theories and rules to be utilized within the limits of 
social government, but signifies a comprehensive way of life.”34  This 
way of life is governed under the fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence, on the 
basis of Shari’a.35  Shari’a law begins with the textual reference point 
 
 27. Julie Dror Chadbourne, Never Wear Your Shoes After Midnight: Legal Trends Under 
the Pakistan Zina Ordinance, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 179, 182 (1999). 
 28. See id. at 183. 
 29. See Redding, supra note 9, at 765-71. 
 30. See Amjad Mahmood Khan, Note, Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in 
Pakistan: An Analysis Under International Law and International Relations, 16 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 217, 224 (2003). 
 31. See PAK. CONST. art. 203; see also Redding, supra note 9, at 770-71 (discussing the 
parallel tracks along which the courts were supposed to function). 
 32. See Redding, supra note 9, at 771-72. 
 33. See id. at 760-62. 
 34. See MAWIL IZZI DIEN, ISLAMIC LAW: FROM HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS TO 
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE 35 (2004). 
 35. See Bowen, supra note 6, 47-48. 
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of the Qur’an,36 which was the book of revelations of the Prophet 
Muhammad.37  The words and actions of the Prophet formulated the 
Sunna38: “the Shari’a has, apart from others, two important sources of 
formulation: the Qur’an and the Sunna, and both . . . have two 
important ingredients: the normative and the contextual.”39  The 
Qur’an is to trump the Sunna if there are contradictory passages or 
wisdoms set out, particularly when dealing with the contextual 
passages.40  The goal is to separate out the normative principles from 
the context in which the Prophet lived, much of which does not apply 
today; however, “sometimes the normative in the Qur’an, which 
imbibed principles, did not appeal to [Islamic jurists] as much as 
certain traditions which were closer to their ‘adat (practices) and 
hence they even went to the extent of giving precedence to the Sunna 
over the Qur’an.”41  Formally, the Sunna is considered a necessary 
source of Islamic jurisprudence, where “all the principles of Islam 
were revealed in a general form,” but submissive to the Qur’an.42  
Functionally, the Sunna has been used as an interpretive tool, often to 
maintain practices over principles.43 
Additionally, the ijmā’, or consensus of scholars, provides a 
secondary (but still divine) source for interpretation of the law.44  
Traditionally, ijmā’ had to be a consensus of all scholars, but today, 
without an overarching Islamic body and belief system, this 
requirement has been lessened.  With the political, social, and 
religious consequences that scholars can face through their 
interpretations of Islam, some have advocated for the entire concept 
of ijmā’ to be reformed or lessened to a “human,” as opposed to a 
divine, source of law along with individual reasoning.45  Ijtihād, or 
 
 36. Also transliterated as Quran, Koran, or Al-Quran.  See, e.g., Qur’an, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quran (last visited Apr. 19, 2007). 
 37. Bowen, supra note 6, at 48. 
 38. See HUGHES, supra note 3, at 622. 
 39. ASGHAR ALI ENGINEER, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM 14 (2d ed. 2004). 
 40. Id. at 15. 
 41. Id. at 14-15. 
 42. DIEN, supra note 34, at 38. 
 43. See ENGINEER, supra note 39, at 13-18.  The hadith, or Prophetic tradition, is another 
mechanism that has been used to maintain context over religious principle and hence formulate 
many of the discriminatory laws against women: “suffice it to say that many a hadith (tradition) 
came into being later in keeping with the cultural and socio-religious prejudices of the 1st and 
2nd centuries of the Islamic calendar.  These traditions must be treated with great caution and 
one should not rush to draw conclusions from them.”  Id. at 16. 
 44. See DIEN, supra note 34, at 40. 
 45. See id. at 47-48. 
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individual reasoning, was developed to allow the Shari’a to be 
adaptable to new and changing circumstances; though it is less 
persuasive authority than the texts, it is recognized as a legitimate 
source of lawmaking.46  In addition to the variety of legal sources 
making up Shari’a, there are distinct schools of thought, each with 
different legal interpretations: Maliki, Hanafi, Shari’i, and Hanbali.47  
Pakistan adheres to the Hanafi school, though there are no strict lines 
of demarcation between the schools and their jurisprudence.48 
The Pakistani Shariat courts were set up in 1979 under the new 
Zia government with the promise to bring Pakistan back to its Islamic 
core of values.  While the intact civil system was supposed to have 
jurisdiction over the “fundamental rights” violations, the Shariat 
courts assumed jurisdiction for family law matters and criminal law 
falling under the Hudood Ordinances.49  The court was composed of 
two levels.50  The lower level included eight judges, each appointed by 
the President.51  There was a stipulation that the Chief Justice must be 
qualified to serve in the secular court system.52  There were three 
ulema, Islamic legal scholars and clergymen, who could take part in 
the court.53  Appeals from the Federal Shariat Courts go to the special 
Shari’a law branch of the Federal Supreme Court.54 
The Hudood Ordinances were codified in 1979 to bring Pakistan 
into “conformity with the injunctions of Islam.”55  The Hudood 
Ordinances set out the definitions and punishments for sexual 
relations outside of marriage.56  Prior to the passage of the Hudood 
Ordinances, the Pakistani Penal Code of 1898, promulgated under 
 
 46. See id. at 51. 
 47. Bowen, supra note 6, at 49. 
 48. Emory School of Law Islamic Family Law Center, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
http://www.law.emory.edu/IFL/legal/pakistan.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2006) [hereinafter 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan].  The four schools of Islamic jurisprudence are from the Sunni 
tradition.  The Shi’a tradition will not be discussed in this note and is a minority population of 
the overall makeup of Islam. 
 49. Redding, supra note 9, at 770-71. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 771-72. 
 54. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, supra note 48. 
 55. Asifa Quraishi, Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan from a 
Woman-Sensitive Perspective, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 287, 288 (1997). 
 56. The Hudood Ordinances also deal with offenses beyond sexual relations, including 
alcohol and property violations, but those will not be discussed here.  See id. 
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British rule, was the governing criminal law.57  There were several 
important differences in the definition of sexual crimes, besides the 
jurisdiction of the court and the Islamic evidentiary requirements, 
discussed below, which differentiated the Code from the Hudood 
Ordinances.  Under the criminal code, women could not be charged 
with adultery.58  The public policy consensus at the time was that 
under the male-dominated culture, women would be unable to 
protect themselves from adultery charges, whether true or false.59  
Additionally, the Code included marital rape as a crime, whereas the 
Ordinances did not.  The Ordinances also have no place for statutory 
rape, which was a traditionally criminal offense.60  The Ordinances 
have been under intense international and national scrutiny that has 
brought some reform, but the traditional text is first discussed below. 
The Hudood Ordinances define “zina” in Article 4: “A man and 
a woman are said to commit zina if they wilfully have sexual 
intercourse without being validly married to each other.”61  Article 5 
sets out the types of zina that are subject to hadd, the highest 
punishment (which includes flogging or stoning):62 
5.  Zina liable to hadd. 
(1) Zina is zina liable to hadd if- 
(a) it is committed by a man who is an adult and is not 
insane with a woman to whom he is not, and does not 
suspect himself to be married; or 
(b) it is committed by a woman who is an adult and is not 
insane with a man to whom she is not, and does not 
suspect herself to be, married. 
(2) Whoever is guilty of Zina liable to hadd shall, subject to the 
provisions of this Ordinance, - 
(a) if he or she is a muhsan,63 be stoned to death at a 
public place; or 
 
 57. Chadbourne, supra note 27, at 189-90.  Those parts of the Code not superseded by the 
Hudood Ordinances remain in effect.  Id. 
 58. Id.  Women were also not able to be charged with rape (zina-bil-jabr) under the 
Pakistani Criminal Code, whereas both men and women can be charged with rape under the 
Hudood Ordinances.  While some may argue that allowing women to be charged with rape is 
more equitable, this provision has not been used to protect male rape victims in Pakistan. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Hudood Ordinance, supra note 7, art. 4. 
 62. See Quraishi, supra note 55, at 310.  Hudood crimes (the plural of hadd) are said to be 
set out specifically in the Qur’an.  Ta’zir crimes are socially legislated crimes, which come with 
lesser punishments.  See id. at 310-11. 
 63. A sane, adult Muslim man or woman.  See Hudood Ordinance, supra note 7, art. 2. 
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(b) if he or she is not muhsan, be punished, at a public 
place; with whipping numbering one hundred stripes. 
(3) No punishment under sub-section (2) shall be executed 
until it has been confirmed by the Court to which an appeal 
from the order of conviction lies; and if the punishment be of 
whipping; until it is confirmed and executed, the convict shall 
be dealt with in the same manner as if sentenced to simple 
imprisonment.64 
Article 6 further specifies the parameters and punishments for rape, 
zina-bil-jabr: 
6.  Zina bil Jabr 
(1) A person is said to commit zina-bil-jabr if he or she has 
sexual inter-course with a woman or man, as the case may be, 
to whom he or she is not validly married, in any of the 
following circumstances, namely: 
(a) against the will of the victim; 
(b) without the consent of the victim; 
(c) with the consent of the victim, when the consent has 
been obtained by putting the victim in fear of death or of 
hurt; or 
(d) with the consent of the victim, when the offender 
knows that the offender is not validly married to the 
victim and that the consent is given because the victim 
believes that the offender is another person to who the 
victim is or believes herself or himself to be validly 
married. 
Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual 
inter-course necessary to the offence of zina-bil-jabr. 
(2) Zina-bil-jabr is liable to hadd if it is committed in the 
committed in the circumstances specified in sub-section (1) of 
section 5. 
(3) Whoever is guilty of zina-bil-jabr liable to hadd shall 
subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, 
(a) if he or she is a muhsan, be stoned to death at a public 
place; or 
(b) if he or she is not muhsan, be punished with whipping 
numbering one hundred stripes, at a public place, and with 
such other punishment, including the sentence of death, as 
the Court may deem fit having regard to the 
circumstances of the case.65 
 
 64. Id. art 5. 
 65. Id. art. 6. 
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The necessary evidentiary elements for zina and zina-bil-jabr were 
laid out in Article 8, a major point of reform66: 
8.  Proof of zina or zina-bil-jabr liable to hadd.  
Proof of zina-bil-jabr liable to hadd shall be in one of the following 
forms, namely: 
(a) the accused makes before a Court of competent jurisdiction 
a confession of the commission of the offence; or 
(b) at least four Muslim adult male witnesses, about whom the 
Court is satisfied, having regard to the requirements of 
tazkiyah al-shuhood, that they are truthful persons and abstain 
from major sins (kabair), give evidence as eye-witnesses of the 
act of penetration necessary to the offence: 
Provided that, if the accused is a non-Muslim, the eye-
witnesses may be non-Muslims.67 
When the requirements of the hadd punishments cannot be met 
(either through a confession or four male witnesses), the action is 
punished through Article 10 under ta’zir, a lesser punishment.68 
10.  Zina or zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 7, whoever commits 
zina or zina-bil-jabr which is not liable to hadd, or for which 
proof in either of the forms mentioned in section 8 is not 
available and the punishment of qazf liable to hadd has not 
been awarded to the complainant, or for which hadd may not 
be enforced under this Ordinance, shall be liable to tazir.69 
Under the traditional Hudood Ordinances, if there was not enough 
evidence to convict the perpetrator of rape (usually lacking four 
witnesses), the victim could be brought up on charges of zina, or 
consensual sex.70  Rapes went unreported because of fear of the 
retribution possible if one’s charges were not sustained, particularly 
because police and officials were often the alleged perpetrators of 
rapes.71  There existed severe biases against women bringing these 
charges within the court systems.  As one judge on the Federal 
Shariat Court stated, “wherever resort to courts is unavoidable for 
any reason, a general possibility that even though the girl was a 
willing party to the occurrence, it would hardly be admitted or 
 
 66. Id. art. 8; see Salman Masood, Pakistan Moves toward Amending Rape Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, at A3.  Medical and DNA evidence will be used in rape cases under the 
criminal code. 
 67. Hudood Ordinance, supra note 7, art. 8. 
 68. See Quraishi supra note 55, at 311. 
 69. Hudood Ordinance, supra note 7, art. 10. 
 70. Quraishi, supra note 55, at 290. 
 71. See id. at 291-92; see also Double Jeopardy, supra note 10. 
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conceded.  In fact it is not uncommon that a woman, who was a 
willing party, acts as a ravished woman . . . .”72 
There were several major legal trends of concern within the 
enforcement of the Hudood Ordinances in Shariat courts.  First was 
the issue of consent and what evidence could be presented to use 
consent as a defense to a rape allegation.73  Evidence of consent 
included delay in reporting, lack of physical evidence, testimony 
about the victim’s “poor moral character,”74 animosity between the 
parties, a valid marriage contract between the parties, or insufficient 
physical resistance.75 
The second concern was the use of pregnancy as proof of zina 
under hadd, triggering the highest of penalties because pregnancy was 
considered a confession, which implicates hadd punishments without 
four witnesses.76  For instance, in the Jehan Mina case, a fifteen-year-
old girl was raped by her uncle and became pregnant.  Her rapists 
were acquitted for lack of evidence, but she was convicted in the 
lower court because of her “unexplained” state of pregnancy, which 
was considered to be a confession to zina.77  Though her punishment 
was eventually lessened to ta’zir levels, the case demonstrated in stark 
contrast the dilemma of pregnant victims who bore the burden of 
proving rape, rather than the state or the perpetrator bearing the 
burden.78 
Third, rape victims feared coming forward to report their 
perpetrators because of judicial conversion of rape, zina-al-jabr, to 
consensual zina if insufficient proof was presented to sustain a rape 
conviction.79  Women faced not only the fear of coming before a court 
 
 72. Quraishi, supra note 55, at 304. 
 73. Chadbourne, supra note 27, at 194. 
 74. Id. at 197. 
 75. Id. at 195, 199-202; see also Ubaidullah v. State, PLD 1983 FSC 117 (holding that since 
the woman did not adequately resist, as evidenced by negligible physical harm to her, she must 
have consented to the sexual intercourse). 
 76. See Chadbourne, supra note 27, at 205-07.  Though some hadd punishments were 
handed down, none to date have actually been carried out in Pakistan.  See Asma Jahangir, Op-
Ed., Women’s Commission and Hudood Ordinances,  DAILY TIMES (Pak.), Sept. 12, 2003, 
available at http://www.peacewomen.org/news/Pakistan/newsarchive03/Zina.html.  Ms. Jahangir 
is the former chairperson of the Human Rights Commission in Pakistan.  See also Double 
Jeopardy, supra note 10. 
 77. Chadbourne, supra note 27, at 206-07. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id.; Jahangir, supra note 76 (stating “[i]n many cases, women alleging rape have been 
arrested and convicted of Zina. The accused men are given benefit of the doubt and acquitted 
by the Federal Shariat Court.”). 
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to face their attacker, but also the potential shame of being accused of 
extramarital sex.80  In the Pakistani culture, and often Islamic culture 
generally, the honor and reputation of a family is dependent on the 
honor and chastity of its women.81  A conviction of zina brought 
immense shame to a woman and her family. 
Lastly, zina punishments have been used as harassment against 
women.  Most of the charges filed against women have been by their 
fathers or their husbands (particularly during times of divorce) in 
order to distance the family from the supposed dishonor or to punish 
the woman.82  This punishment can arise because the woman has tried 
to run away from her family or because her husband wishes to divorce 
the victim and remarry.  The poor and illiterate have borne the brunt 
of these laws.83 
C. Current Reforms—The Women’s Protection Bill 
Until 2001 and the War on Terror, Pakistan did not receive 
federal funding from the United States because of its troubling 
human rights record, particularly the Hudood Ordinances’ 
discrimination against women and allowance of death by stoning.84  
The War on Terror, led by the United States, has given Pakistan 
greater acceptance at the international level than it had previously 
experienced, as well as a decrease in pressure to change its human 
 
 80. See Chadbourne, supra note 27, at 211 (explaining the practice of judicial conversion of 
failed rape cases to zina charges). 
 81. See THE WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, GENDER AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
(2004), available at http://www.medea.be/files/WB_Gender_EN.pdf#search=%22mena%20 
development%20report%22 [hereinafter MENA REPORT]. 
 82. See id.; see also Chadbourne, supra note 27, at 217-19.  There have also been significant 
problems with female prisoners, often those charged with zina, who have been severely abused 
or raped by police officers.  For a more detailed analysis, see Jahangir supra note 76 (“A very 
large number of women have been tortured, molested and raped by the police with impunity.  
From 1980 to 1987 the Federal Shariat Court alone heard 3,399 appeals of Zina involving female 
prisoners.  This is only the tip of the iceberg, given the number of women arrested and released 
before reaching the appeal stage.  Once a woman is accused of Zina she stands stigmatized 
regardless of subsequent acquittals.”).  See also Double Jeopardy, supra note 10, at 32. 
 83. See Pakistani Women Speak Up on Rape, supra note 1 (quoting a legal aid worker 
regarding women in a local prison accused of zina, “[t]hese women are totally illiterate, hardly 
aware of their rights . . .”). 
 84. See Josh Kruskol, Legislative Watch/Legislative Focus, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 63, 63-64 
(2004) (Kruskol discusses the Foreign Operations Appropriations and Defense Department 
Appropriations Bills’ Amendments, the Leahy Law, which was consistently passed from 1997 
on.  The bill prevented US funds from supporting any army or force in a nation where “gross 
violations of human rights were being committed.”  Pakistan was ineligible for all aid until 2001, 
but now receives in excess of $395 million because of its support in the War on Terror). 
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rights norms.85  Despite the drop in attention to the country’s human 
rights violations, General Musharraf, the current Pakistani President 
who took over through a military coup in 1999,86 has pledged to fight 
discrimination against women.87  Women’s and human rights groups 
had been advocating for years for a repeal of the onerous Hudood 
Ordinances, emphasizing that the law made it impossible to charge 
and convict rapists.88  Additionally, the threat of female rape victims 
having the law turned on them for a conviction of zina if rape could 
not be proved severely discouraged women from coming forward to 
report such crimes.89  The Ordinances were particularly troubling 
because of the statistics coming out of the country’s major human 
rights organizations: on average, a woman was raped every two hours 
and gang raped every four hours in Pakistan.90 
At the International Women’s Day in 2002, Musharraf pledged 
that to women’s “empowerment, protection and security, I stand 
totally committed.”91  This pledge proved difficult to keep.  When the 
Women’s Protection Bill first appeared on the Pakistani political 
stage in September 2006, it was met with ardent resistance from “hard 
line” Islamic groups.92  The bill eventually was pulled from 
parliamentary consideration.93  Despite the rhetorical assurances, 
Musharraf seemed “[a]ssailed on all sides, [his] only certain support is 
the military—and the Pakistani army is not prepared to take on the 
Islamists over women’s rights.”94  Surprisingly, after renegotiation 
with human rights groups and religious officials, a reformulation of 
the bill was released and passed in both the Pakistani House and the 
Senate in late November 2006.95  Though conservative religious 
 
 85. See id. (explaining that continued funding despite human rights violations decreases the 
effectiveness of the Leahy Law); see also Khan, supra note 30, at 217-18. 
 86. See Perry S. Smith, Silent Witness: Discrimination Against Women in the Pakistani Law 
of Evidence, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 21, 24 (2003). 
 87. See id. at  55-56. 
 88. See Barbara Plett, How Pakistan’s Rape Reform Ran Aground, BBC NEWS, Sept. 15, 
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5346968.stm; Jahangir, supra note 76. 
 89. See Jahangir, supra note 76. 
 90. These numbers are thought to be a low estimate because of the vast number of rapes 
that go unreported each year.  Pakistani Senate Backs Rape Bill, BBC NEWS, Nov. 23, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6178214.stm. 
 91. Smith, supra note 86, at 55. 
 92. Salman Masood, World Briefing Asia: Pakistan: Rape Reform Law Delayed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A8. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Plett, supra note 88. 
 95. See Pakistani Senate Backs Rape Bill, supra note 90. 
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groups voiced opposition and boycotted the vote, the compromise 
moved all rape cases from the Shariat courts back to the Pakistani 
penal code and civil courts.96  A rape case cannot be converted to 
Shariat courts, and thus to any form of zina or fornication, after it is 
reported to civil authorities.97  In the civil courts, the Shariat 
requirement of four male witnesses is supplanted by civil evidentiary 
procedures, including the admission of DNA and medical evidence.98  
As a concession to some of the more hard-line religious groups, 
“fornication,” defined as consensual sex between unmarried persons, 
was made a criminal offense.99  Thus, it is possible that the 
discriminatory practice of accusing women of zina as punishment for 
“dishonoring” the family,100 or as a mechanism for husbands trying to 
rid themselves of their wives could be translated into accusations of 
fornication.  Though hailed as a great step forward for the women of 
Pakistan, it is likely that until the Hudood Ordinances are completely 
reformed, women will not be fully protected.101  Additionally, though 
the new bill is hopeful, no actual process of implementation has yet 
been revealed.  As one commentator described it: 
The bill is a modest first step towards a more rational policy on 
sexual assault and rape . . . .  Its passage should be welcomed by all 
right-thinking persons . . . .  Whether the bill reshapes the entire 
political landscape once and for all will now depend on how the 
government reacts to the changed ground realities and on the 
quantum of bitterness that remains within the ranks of the 
opposition.102 
Implementation of the current reforms and movement toward 
increased equality, particularly the repeal of the entire Hudood 
Ordinance, require an understanding of how and why these reforms 
were eventually successful, though extremely controversial and 
divisive.  The international human rights mechanisms were not a large 
 
 96. NA Passes Women’s Protection Bill, HUM. RIGHTS COMM’N OF PAK., Nov. 16, 2006, 
http://www.hrcp-web.org/archive_news_list.cfm.  See David Montero, Rape Law Reform Angers 
Pakistani Islamists, CBS NEWS, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/17/world/ 
main2192884.shtml (discussing the ardent protests of the Islamists groups who claimed that 
changes to the Hudood Ordinance would make Pakistan a “free-sex society”). 
 97. NA Passes Women’s Protection Bill, supra note 96. 
 98. Montero, supra note 96. 
 99. Id.; NA Passes Women’s Protection Bill, supra note 96. 
 100. See MENA REPORT, supra note 81, at 7. 
 101. See, e.g., Pakistan Votes to Amend Rape Law, supra note 8; Press Hails New Rape Law, 
BBC NEWS, Nov. 17, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6157922.stm. 
 102. See Press Hails New Rape Law, supra note 101. 
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part of making these reforms work, and cannot be a large part of 
future reforms unless their tactics and methodologies are changed. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 
Locals also have a very negative view of NGOs.  Firstly, they think 
they are all funded by Americans or foreigners.  They reason that we 
belong to an Islamic society and that western-funded NGOs work 
against Islamic traditions and values.  But we have slowly won their 
confidence and trust.  We have told them that this crisis centre is their 
organisation and we are here to solve their problems.103 
There are three main schools of thought regarding human rights: 
“universalism,” which argues that all human rights must be applied to 
all cultures and thus Shari’a law and religious authorities should not 
be allowed to dictate and subsequently curtail human rights; “strict 
cultural relativism,” which advocates that cultures are so vastly 
different and beliefs so irreconcilable that there can be no set of 
values universally applied; therefore, countries should be at liberty to 
set their own standards (religious or otherwise); and “moderate 
cultural relativism,” which accepts a core set of universal rights that 
are necessarily valid for all cultures, but disagrees that all rights apply 
to all cultures.104  None of these categories can adequately capture the 
dilemma the international community faces when dealing with Islam, 
Shari’a, and human (particularly women’s) rights. 
Some scholars, such as Samuel Huntington, have argued that 
there is an ongoing and worsening clash of cultures that prohibits the 
international community from intervening and implementing its 
concept of human rights.105  They contend Islam requires a distinctive 
approach to rights, applying a specific cultural relativist argument.106  
This argument has been used consistently throughout certain Islamic 
nations and conventions.107  Human rights necessarily implicate 
religious views, gender roles, governmental actions, and notions of 
 
 103. Pakistani Women Speak Up on Rape, supra note 1 (quoting Mussarat Shefi, an aid 
worker in rural Pakistan who is employed by a non-governmental organization (NGO) that runs 
a women’s crisis center). 
 104. Morgan-Foster, supra note 4, at 70. 
 105. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE 
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1998). See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic 
Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 307, 310-12 
(1994). 
 106. See Mayer, supra note 105, at 309. 
 107. See Org. of the Islamic Conference, Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Res. 
49/10-P Annex 1 (Aug. 5, 1990), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/19/19%20 
icfm-political-en.htm [hereinafter Cairo Declaration]. 
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freedom.  Rhetoric implying that Islamic values are being attacked by 
those outside the Islamic world has proven powerful: the imperialism 
of reformers and the preservation of Islamic culture have been ready 
defenses when governments, groups, or patriarchal systems have been 
unwilling or unable to change their discriminatory provisions.108  
Perhaps this fear is not entirely unfounded.  There is a real sense in 
the Middle East that international NGOs are following the American 
military into the region.109  There is also the argument that the 
traditional “West” focuses on rights violations outside its geographic 
sphere, while committing many of the same human rights violations 
within its own boundaries, as well as selectively ignoring human rights 
violations by those countries who provide military, economic, or 
political support to Western causes.110 
While the assertion that human rights are Western rights is not 
necessarily true, until that stereotype is broken, little progress can be 
made.  The changes in rhetoric and methodology that can make 
human rights truly universal must come from both sides of the 
argument: from the religious groups who advocate that so-called 
Western human rights have no place in Islamic societies, and from the 
international human rights groups, which have not developed 
programming for Islamic nations to use their own legal structures to 
effect sustainable human rights changes.  While human rights work 
cannot be effective when there is a perception of “exclusive Western 
authorship,”111 there are “differences between cultural sensitivity and 
cultural stagnation attributable to power imbalances within 
society.”112 
A. United Nations 
Countries with predominately Islamic populations were key 
founding members of the United Nations and all signed the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which established a basic 
 
 108. See id.; see also Montero, supra note 96. 
 109. Naz K. Modirzadeh, Taking Islamic Law Seriously: INGOs and the Battle for Muslim 
Hearts and Minds, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 191, 192 (2006). 
 110. See Mayer, supra note 105, at 313; see also Kruskol, supra note 84, at 64.  For instance, 
the United States has refused to ratify the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), among other international rights treaties. 
 111. Morgan-Foster, supra note 4, at 71. 
 112. Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence between 
Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 104 (1993). 
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common standard for international human rights.113  Ann Elizabeth 
Mayer, a prominent scholar on human rights and Islam, argues that 
“Muslim particularism” with regard to human rights was not 
advocated until the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.114  Pakistan 
played an important early role in the discussions and passage of the 
UDHR, particularly the provision on freedom of religion and 
expression.115  Article 18 states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”116  
Article 19 asserts, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers.”117  Pakistan 
vehemently argued against Saudi Arabia to successfully maintained 
that these provisions on freedom of religion and freedom of 
conscience were not only compliant, but required under the laws of 
Islam.118  Pakistan argued that Islam was against compulsion, 
demonstrating that the laws of Shari’a can be compliant with human 
rights and that such compliance might depend more on the political 
situation of a nation than on its religious foundations. 
As a proponent of and signatory to the UDHR, Pakistan assured 
the world that human rights and equality119 would be upheld within its 
borders because of its adherence to Islamic law and principles.  In 
addition to its participation in the UDHR, Pakistan is also a signatory 
to the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), which was passed by the United Nations General 
 
 113. Mayer, supra note 105, at 321-22. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Khan, supra note 30, at 220-22. 
 116. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 18, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), [hereinafter Declaration]. 
 117. Id. art. 19. 
 118. See Khan, supra note 30, at 221-22. 
 119. Article 2 of the Declaration assures that “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.”  Declaration, supra note 116, art. 2.  Article 29 notes that no rights will be curtailed 
(such as the freedom of religion) unless they interfere with another’s rights.  Id. art. 29 
(emphasis added). 
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Assembly in 1979.120  CEDAW includes provisions on freedom of 
religion, but stipulates a hierarchy of values and rights in which the 
freedom of religion is limited when and if it inhibits the rights of 
others.121 
Despite commitments stemming from international conventions, 
the rights of women in Pakistan have not been stable since the 
conventions’ passings, and have actually decreased with the 
subsequent “Islamization” of the constitution and laws such as the 
Hudood Ordinance.  Human Rights Watch explains: 
[W]omen were at the center of a fundamental paradox that was to 
affect their status in Pakistani society . . . on the one hand, their 
increasing freedom was intricately linked with a political movement 
to create an independent Muslim state; on the other, conservative 
interpretations of the identity of that same state—depending on 
social, political and economic conditions—was turned against 
women as a means of consolidating state power in times of 
instability.122 
The religious identity of Pakistan has allowed increasingly 
conservative and hard-line versions of Islam to dictate its human 
rights, particularly in times of struggle.  Despite the lip service given 
to international human rights mechanisms, the mechanisms have not 
been successful advocates for the women of Pakistan.  Rights and 
powers of Shariat courts and the enforcement of the Hudood 
Ordinances have not been curtailed because they infringe on 
women’s rights.  Instead of protecting rape victims, the Ordinances 
were used to punish perceived dishonor or to inflict punishment on 
victims of violent crimes.123  The international documents to which 
Pakistan was a signatory seemed unable to help, usually because the 
country insisted that Islam and Shari’a law prevented it from truly 
implementing real change.124  The reservations and declarations 
 
 120. See Frances Raday, Culture, Religion and Gender, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 663, 664 (2003); 
Hussain, supra note 14, at 241.  Pakistan’s courts have, at times, recognized their obligations 
under CEDAW, but often cite Pakistan’s reservations to the Convention as justification to 
refrain from truly enforcing  the rights that CEDAW protects.  See Smith, supra note 86, at 29. 
 121. Raday, supra note 120, at 668-69.  Pakistan has yet to ratify the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, which also includes a hierarchy of rights with religion limited by 
the rights of others.  See id.; see also Amnesty International’s Guide to UN Human Rights 
Council Candidates: Pakistan, AMNESTY INT’L, May 5, 2006, http://www.amnesty.org/un_hrc/ 
pakistan.html. 
 122. See generally Double Jeopardy, supra note 10, at 29. 
 123. See id. at 60. 
 124. U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservations Relating 
to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, at 26, U.N. 
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stipulated that any right was subject to Pakistan’s constitution, which, 
as discussed above, underwent continued “Islamization,” beginning 
with the repugnancy clause.125  The international rights movement has 
been unable or unwilling to use any real enforcement mechanisms to 
bring these rights covenants into realistic practice.126 
Some authors have compared this religious discrimination to the 
discrimination practiced during apartheid in South Africa.127  As 
Professor Mayer explains, the international community came together 
in combating apartheid, harshly stigmatizing South Africa’s racial 
separation and discrimination: 
The heinous nature of its treatment of non-Whites prompted 
sanctions and boycotts in the 1980s both at the national and 
international level.  South Africa wound up a pariah state, excluded 
from international sports and ostracized by other members of the 
international community, leading to the crippling of its economy.  
Unable to withstand the sanctions, South Africa ended its apartheid 
policy in 1991.128 
Unlike CEDAW, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid, all of which combated apartheid, included 
provisions for serious economic and social sanctions against the 
perpetrating countries, forcing South Africa to embrace the human 
rights norms of the international community and end the abhorrent 
treatment of black South Africans.129 
The international community has been unwilling or unable to 
provide the same sort of enforcement to protect the women of the 
world.  Although racial and gender discrimination are equally 
 
Doc. CEDAW/SP/2006/2 (Apr. 10, 2006) (noting Pakistan’s official reservation: “The accession 
by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the [said convention] is subject to the 
provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”). 
 125. See supra Part I.A. 
 126. See Darren C. Zook, Decolonizing Law: Identity Politics, Human Rights and the United 
Nations, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 95, 96 (2006) (discussing the centrality of the United Nations in 
terms of human rights discussions and its need for reform to more ably enforce and encourage 
the international human rights movement as one that applies to all). 
 127. See generally Ann Elizabeth Mayer, A “Benign Apartheid”: How Gender Apartheid 
Has Been Rationalized, 5 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237 (2000-2001) [hereinafter 
Benign Apartheid]. 
 128. Id. at 241. 
 129. See id. (implying that sanctions were crucial to breaking down apartheid in South 
Africa). 
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prohibited by Article 2 of the UDHR, thus far only racial 
discrimination has been successfully curbed by enforcement 
mechanisms.130  Also, the international community has accepted 
religious and cultural rationalizations for discrimination against 
women, whereas such rationalizations were uniformly rejected during 
the apartheid debate.131  Attempts to effectively enforce CEDAW 
have been met with adamant opposition, in particular from Islamic 
countries that declared reservations to the Convention.132  This 
resistance led one scholar to conclude: 
CEDAW effectively seems to have a lesser status than other human 
rights conventions, being treated more as a statement of intent than 
as a set of internationally binding obligations, and that the 
culturally-sensitive nature of the content is a factor influencing 
countries to see CEDAW more as rhetoric than as international 
law.133 
CEDAW is portrayed as a religious and cultural battle, one which the 
international community has refused to fight. 
Pakistan is a country built on a religious identity.  From its 
inception, it has defined itself according to Islam, and that Islam has 
become increasingly radicalized during the country’s difficult times.134  
Rightly or wrongly, segments of the governmental and political 
establishment have convinced portions of the populace that debating 
human rights is a form of Western imperialism, particularly in the 
arena of women’s rights.  Perceptions shape policy.  In light of 
Pakistan’s recent cooperation with the United States, accusations and 
fears of Western imperialism may resonate strongly.135  There is a risk 
of creating situations where Muslims feel they must choose between 
human rights and Shari’a law, which many believe come directly from 
God: “In a [z]ero [s]um [c]alculus, God [a]lways [w]ins.”136  The 
 
 130. See id. at 245-46.  Article 2 states, “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”  
Declaration, supra note 116 (emphasis added). 
 131. See Benign Apartheid, supra note 127, at 266. 
 132. Id.  A study commissioned in 1987 to examine the workings of CEDAW in relation to 
reservations made by Islamic nations was adamantly opposed by those reserving nations.  
Instead of defending the Convention and using this as an opportunity for discussion, the study 
was abandoned, demonstrating that the international community would back down on this 
Convention in the face of opposition.  Id. at 271-72. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See supra Part I. 
 135. See Morgan-Foster, supra note 4, at 70. 
 136. Modirzadeh, supra note 109, at 230. 
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question then becomes how to bridge the gap between the two 
arguably complementary components, human rights and religion, 
particularly when existing international conventions have been 
portrayed (and proven) to be weak mechanisms for promoting 
change.  One suggestion from the Islamic community is the Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. 
B. Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
The Cairo Declaration was written and endorsed by the foreign 
ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an 
international organization founded in 1973 to which most 
predominately Muslim countries belong, including Pakistan.137  The 
OIC came together in 1990 to produce a document that was a hybrid 
of international and Islamic elements, proclaiming the existence of an 
“Islamic counter-model of human rights.”138  Although the preamble 
of the OIC Charter states members are “reaffirming their 
commitment to the UN Charter and fundamental Human Rights, the 
purposes and principles of which provide the basis for fruitful co-
operation amongst all people,”139 Articles 24 and 25 of the Cairo 
Declaration proclaim that anything within the document is subject to 
the Islamic Shari’a.140  Despite such provisions defining the entire 
agreement and limiting the rights thereof, no attempt is made to 
define the parameters of Islamic Shari’a.141 
Because of the undefined limits of the Islamic Shari’a, it is very 
difficult to grasp the consequences or reaches of the rights within the 
Declaration.  For instance, Article 1 proclaims that human beings 
“are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and 
responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, 
colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affirmation, social 
status or other considerations.”142  Article 6 specifically addresses 
women’s rights, stating, “woman is equal to man in human dignity” 
 
 137. Mayer, supra note 105, at 327; Organization of the Islamic Conference, http://www.oic-
oci.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
 138. Mayer, supra note 105, at 327. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Article 24 states, “All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject 
to the Islamic Shari’ah” while Article 25 proclaims: “The Islamic Shari’ah is the only source of 
reference for the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration.”  Cairo 
Declaration, supra note 107. 
 141. Mayer, supra note 105, at 328-29. 
 142. Cairo Declaration, supra note 107, art. 1. 
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and has “rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform.”143  Article 12 
promises the right to free movement, within the “framework” of the 
Shari’a.144  Though many of these rights sound similar to those within 
the United Nations’ documents, all are subject to Article 24 and 25—
the Shari’a.  Since there is no definition of the Shari’a, countries are 
left to formulate their own definitions.  “There is precious little 
consensus on what shari’a means and how it should be applied 
today.”145 
Until there is any consensus, the Cairo Declaration remains more 
of a shield from critiques of human rights abuses than a sword able to 
fight those abuses.  Signatories to the Declaration claim they adhere 
to the Declaration through their own interpretation of the Shari’a.146  
As Pakistan has demonstrated with the Hudood Ordinances, those 
interpretations may be used to serve the patriarchal goals of society, 
forcing women into more subservient and fear-dominated positions.  
Until there is more of a consensus as to how Shari’a is applied in the 
human rights context, the Declaration harms women’s rights.  It could 
be a useful tool for Muslim human rights activists and international 
human rights groups if some sort of consensus could be reached, 
because it would help dispel the stereotype of Western authorship of 
human rights; however, as the restrictions on the ijmā’ or consensus 
of scholars have demonstrated, there is little chance for a consensus 
anytime soon.147  Arguably, attempting to force a consensus on 
religious beliefs could be just as harmful, if not more so, than trying to 
push for a consensus on international human rights.  As of now, a 
country-specific focus is necessary to implement changes within the 
existing international framework where the international 
mechanisms, particularly CEDAW, have been enforced ineffectively 
and where Islam-specific mechanisms have been used as shield 
against critique. 
C. Country Reforms through Islamic Law 
Some Islamic countries have used Shari’a law to vastly improve 
the rights of their women.  For instance, Morocco has undergone 
 
 143. Id. art. 6. 
 144. Id. art 12. 
 145. Ehsan Masood, Thinkers Seek Middle Path, THE AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 19, 2006, at 29. 
 146. See Mayer, supra note 105, at 327-30. 
 147. See supra Part I. 
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major reforms to their Mudawana, or code of personal status.148  The 
“newly reformed Mudawana is an example of . . . public policy goals 
rendered in conjunction with the precepts of traditional Islamic 
law.”149  Using the legal interpretive structures already in place, the 
country successfully defined its Shari’a law as a protective device for 
its women rather than a persecutory one.  In actuality, the Prophet 
Muhammad enhanced the rights of Islamic women during his time.150  
Before the spread of Islam across the Arabian peninsula, women had 
no legal status and could be sold into marriage at any time against 
their will.151  The Prophet implemented what were, at the time, 
revolutionary reforms to protect women’s status and inheritance 
rights.152 
The Moroccan government knew that the reforms could be 
divisive but wisely used Islamic law, not international human rights 
rhetoric, to shape and reinforce the reforms.  There was a “deeply 
rooted and lasting desire on the part of the Moroccan people to 
maintain a distinctly Muslim identity—an identity that at once meshes 
with notions of democracy, plurality, secure political and legal rights 
and privileges.”153  There are conflicting verses within the Qur’an and 
the Sunna on the rights and equalities of women.  The two verses 
quoted with frequency to justify the submissive status of women are: 
“women have such honorable rights as obligations, but their men 
have a degree above them”154 and “men are in charge of women, 
because God has made the one of them to excel the other, and 
because they spend of their property [for the support of women].”155  
Conversely, there are a plethora of verses on the equality of men and 
women in status, labor, property, and standing before the law.156 
Morocco managed to use these equality verses to trump the 
conflicting ones; the legal system was able to pull the “normative” 
principles that Shari’a entailed and leave behind the contextually and 
 
 148. Laura A. Weingartner, Comment, Family Law and Reform in Morocco—The 
Mudawana: Modernist Islam and Women’s Rights in the Code of Personal Status, 82 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 687, 687-88 (2005). 
 149. Id. at 692. 
 150. Bowen, supra note 6, at 56. 
 151. Weingartner, supra note 148, at 692-93. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 707-08. 
 154. Qur’an 2:228. 
 155. Id. 4:34; see also Bowen, supra note 6, at 57. 
 156. See Bowen, supra note 6, at 54-55. 
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culturally sanctioned discrimination.157  The country reformed its 
Shari’a system while still leaving it intact: marriage, polygamy, 
divorce, child custody, and inheritance are all still under the 
Mudawana, but all have been changed to better protect women’s 
rights and equality.158  The leaders of the Moroccan reforms knew 
they would need the support of the religious leaders to pass the 
legislation and effectively implement the changes.159  Focusing on the 
teachings of Mohammed proclaiming that the Creator “shall not lose 
sight of the labor of any of you who labors in My way, be it man or 
woman; each of you is equal to the other,”160 the government 
managed to retain its religious identity while legitimately overhauling 
the assumptions underpinning the Shari’a legal system.  There was 
still an outcry against the king and the reforms from conservative 
groups.  The Justice and Charity Islamist Movement proclaimed that 
the “reforms have been elaborated in response to the desires of 
foreigners and the feminist movement.”161  This outcry was lessened 
and somewhat quelled because of the reliance on religious law to 
change religious understandings.  Instead of introducing the reforms 
as an attempt at compliance with international human rights norms, 
the changes were seen as Islamic reforms.162 
Muslim feminists have consistently argued that Islam is not 
antithetical to gender equality.  For instance, the Muslim Women’s 
League is an American nonprofit organization working to 
“implement the values of Islam and thereby reclaim the status of 
women as free, equal and vital contributors to society.”163  Like many 
other religious texts, the Qur’an can be used as a document of 
equality or a document of repression.  Morocco gives an apt example 
of how the religious text can be formulated into a human rights 
document.  During the second conference on human rights in Islam in 
 
 157. See ENGINEER, supra note 39, at 14-15; see also supra Part I. 
 158. Weingartner, supra note 148, at 697-706.  Marriage now is recognized as being under 
the direction of both spouses and the age of consent for both males and females is now eighteen.  
Women are no longer required to select a male guardian to approve the marriage.  Polygamy is 
only allowed at the discretion of a judge after draconian legal provisions are applied and it can 
be forbidden in the marriage contract.  Unilateral divorce on the part of the husband is no 
longer valid; a slow process involving mediation is now required.  The mother is now the 
preferred guardian in child custody cases.  For inheritance cases, children born out of wedlock 
are now legally recognized and entitled to inheritance.  Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Qur’an 3:195. 
 161. Weingartner, supra note 148, at 709-10. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Muslim Women’s League, http://www.mwlusa.org/ (last visited March 28, 2007). 
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1993, the Saudi Arabian foreign minister claimed Islam gave “a 
comprehensive system for universal human rights” and had at its core 
“all the legal texts necessary for ensuring their implementation and 
enforcement.”164  While Saudi Arabia has used the Qur’an to curtail 
the rights of its women, the statement was nonetheless truthful.165  The 
Qur’an and Shari’a law can provide universal human rights and 
equality if interpreted to do so.  Shari’a legal systems are legal 
principles built on religious beliefs.  As one commentator notes, 
Islamic law “blurs the line between victim and violator, between state 
and subject.”166  In order for reforms to be made within a sovereign 
legal system, they must be accepted as legitimate.  In Islamic states 
with Shari’a law systems, including Pakistan, these reforms must be 
legitimate within both legal and religious interpretation.  The 
question, then, is not whether there are abuses of universal human 
rights in the Shari’a law systems, but how to find common ground 
between human rights law and Shari’a law.167 
III.  WORKABLE REALITIES WITHIN PAKISTAN 
Pakistan’s emergence as an independent nation owed much to its 
women, who fought side by side with other political leaders to forge a 
new nation.  Pakistan’s emergence as an independent nation was also 
built solidly upon its religious identity.  The Shari’a law system will 
not be dismantled anytime soon within Pakistan.168  The reforms of 
the Hudood Ordinance, though hopeful, have not been demonstrated 
in practice.  There is still the possibility that innocent women may be 
prosecuted under the fornication provision of the amended 
ordinance.169  The vehement protests against the Women’s Protection 
Bill demonstrate the continued divisions between those arguing for a 
reformed state and those advocating for what they view as a 
traditionally Islamic governance structure.  Pakistan displays a history 
 
 164. HRH Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Address at 
the World Conference on Human Rights (June 15, 1993), (transcript at 
http://www.saudiembassy.net/Issues/HRights/hr-Vienna-93.html). 
 165. See Saudi Arabia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
Feb. 25, 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27937.htm. 
 166. Modirzadeh, supra note 109, at 202. 
 167. See id. at 194. 
 168. See Double Jeopardy, supra note 10 (discussing the importance of religious identity and 
the combination of religious and legal ideas within the governance model of the country). 
 169. See Montero, supra note 96. 
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of governmental instability and a return to more conservative Islamic 
tenants whenever political strife develops.170 
In order to successfully promote human rights in Pakistan, it is 
necessary to bridge the gap between human rights and Islamic law 
instead of claiming that the former is inherently incompatible with the 
latter.  Pakistan’s religious identity has shaped its history and it must 
be a part of the process of promoting equality.  Researchers who have 
studied international human rights groups and their work in Islamic 
countries have found that the typical method has been one of 
“naming and shaming” the offending country in an attempt to force 
compliance.171  While this may have worked with South Africa, the 
enforcement mechanisms for CEDAW and other rights conventions 
have been minimally successful and countries have felt little pressure 
to comply.172  Additionally, the international community’s focus on 
Pakistan has changed after September 11, from its instability and 
human rights abuses to its potential as a security ally.173  Any 
international pressure on Pakistan to change its human rights abuses 
has thereby lessened.  If the international community is not willing to 
force change through enforcement and sanctions as it did in South 
Africa, rights groups must find alternative methods toward reform. 
Professor Modirzadeh explains that “Islamic personal status law 
as applied in every state today, and according to all mainstream 
juridical schools, is overly discriminatory.  Simply put, within a 
Shari’a personal status system, men and women do not share equal 
legal status.”174  The Hudood Ordinances represent this lack of 
equality, and their continued existence, even though reformed, may 
well still haunt the lives and destroy the legal status of women.  As an 
overpowering defeat of a study on Muslim reservations to CEDAW175 
and the resulting lack of CEDAW enforcement have demonstrated, 
the international protocols in place can cause more division than 
consensus.  A study on international NGOs’ reports on Shari’a law 
found that the organizations’ findings consistently refused to state 
there was a serious legal conflict between the way Shari’a was applied 
 
 170. See Chadbourne, supra note 27, at 182. 
 171. See Modirzadeh, supra note 109, at 198. 
 172. See id. at 199. 
 173. See Khan, supra note 30, at 217-18. 
 174. Modirzadeh, supra note 109, at 207. 
 175. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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and international law.176  The reports to the international community 
separated the Shari’a system from the perpetuation of abuse.  For 
instance, a Human Rights Watch report on the Ordinances states, 
“Human Rights Watch has no opposition to Islamic law per se and 
does not object to laws founded on religion, provided that human 
rights are respected and the principle of equality before the law is 
upheld.”177  While in some respects this is an appropriate separation 
because Shari’a is not necessarily a tool of repression, depending on 
its interpretation, there must be an acceptance that Shari’a is both the 
legitimate legal system within which these reforms must occur and the 
system that is currently used to perpetrate the abuses in Pakistan and 
elsewhere.  The study, which primarily examined reports from 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, claimed the 
international NGOs failed to see Islamic and Shari’a law as “real 
law.”178  By ignoring the reality that Shari’a was both the legitimate 
legal system and the perpetrator of abuses, the groups were unable to 
address the problem of reforming the Shari’a itself. 
Making lasting changes in Pakistan is going to require an 
understanding and acceptance of its reliance on religious laws.  Its 
religious identity has been the touchstone of legitimacy throughout 
Pakistan’s history.179  An acceptance of sustainable human rights 
norms is going to have to speak through this religious identity.  
Instead of identifying human rights as international and universal, 
perhaps at this stage they need to be discussed as Islamic reforms, 
through international organizations on the ground using local workers 
and Shari’a experts.180 
CONCLUSION 
As scholar Randall Peerenboom notes, there is not an “accepted 
understanding of what a right is—whether collective or group rights 
and nonjusticiable social, economic and cultural rights are really 
 
 176. Modirzadeh, supra note 109, at 211.  Ms. Modirzadeh is a senior associate with the 
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research associated with the Harvard School of 
Public Health and a former assistant professor of international human rights law at the 
American University of Cairo. 
 177. Double Jeopardy, supra note 10, at 147. 
 178. See supra Part II.B (discussing that there is no consensus on Shari’a law and on how it 
should be applied, which is why the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam has failed to 
bring about any real reforms in countries’ law). 
 179. See Double Jeopardy, supra note 10. 
 180. See id. at 229-33. 
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rights; or how rights relate to duties; or whether a discourse of rights 
is complementary or antithetical to, or better or worse than, a 
discourse of needs or capabilities.”181  The debate over whether 
human rights are universal or cultural seems circular and unceasing, 
and while the debate continues, the rights violations continue.  
Pakistan is a nation desperately in need of the underlying values of 
international human rights, particularly for female equality. It is also 
a nation built on a religious identity that has been used to shield 
against any human rights reform.  The partial reform of the Hudood 
Ordinances demonstrates a way of the future and an alternate path 
toward underlying universal human rights.  Human rights can be 
universal even if they are reached through different methods.  If the 
language and terminology is changed to make the reforms through 
the Qur’an instead of through international human rights documents, 
their impact is still equally felt and probably more sustaining.  Human 
rights have been preached in terms of an “us versus them” argument.  
When conflicts arise, any terminology or stereotype associated with 
the other side becomes a target for attack.  The path for continued 
reform and protection of Pakistan’s women is still unclear.  The 
pertinent United Nations documents such as CEDAW have not been 
enforced.  Islamic-specific human rights documents have been used to 
allow abuses rather than prevent them.  Perhaps the solution is a 
compromise between the two: a use of Islamic legal structures and 
sources (the Qur’an and Sunna), using specific interpretations of the 
texts that bring about the same result of universal human rights as the 
international documents.  The goal is universal rights, which are not 
Western-authored or Islamic-authored, but a blend of the two using 
different terminologies and mechanisms that end with the same 
underlying equality. 
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